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The Ongoing "Turf War" for Louisiana Tort Law:
Interpreting Immunity and the Solidarity Skirmish
Frank L. Maraist*
Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.-
To reach the Bosporus, Jason and the Argonauts had to sail between the
Symplegades, two large rock faces which crashed together at regular intervals.
The obvious problem for Jason and other travelers was that when the two rock
faces crashed, anything caught in the middle was pulverized.' Symbolically, the
rock faces represent the opposites that people face in the "real" world:
good/evil, day/night, man/woman-and in the legal world-plaintiff/defendant.2
The key for Jason and other travelers was to get beyond this pair of earthly
opposites-and reach the land of adventure or land of the gods beyond.
Today, Louisiana's tort lawyer may feel like Jason must have felt looking
out from the bow of the Argo, seeing those gargantuan rocks crash together.
Louisiana tort law's Symplegades, however, have other names: the Louisiana
Legislature and the Louisiana Supreme Court. Like the mythical rocks, the
legislature and the court may be seen as opposing forces, at least to tort lawyers.
Those two lawgivers have collided on so many tort issues that it frequently is
difficult to determine what the law is and how long it will stay that way. That
state of affairs is as perilous to the lawyer as the Symplegades were to the
ancient mariner.
The Louisiana tort lawyer and his client reasonably may conclude that over
the past quarter century or so the legislature and the court have so frequently
taken opposite positions on tort issues that they are in a "turf" war for control
of Louisiana tort law. Skirmishes between the legislative and judicial branches
are inevitable in a system of government which demands judicial interpretation
of legislative action. In Louisiana, however, an objective observer might
conclude that the battle is "pitched." Thus, the Louisiana tort lawyer's major
task is to find for his client some way through Louisiana's modem day legal
Symplegades. It is not our mission in this essay to provide a foolproof map
through the rocks. Rather, we discuss some examples or "sites" of the "turf"
battle between the legislature and the court. Most notably, we analyze the recent
"solidarity skirmish" between the two. We also venture some thoughts about the
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battle and its causes and whether either side should bear any blame for the
hostilities.
At first, one may wonder if the fight for control of Louisiana tort law is a
fair one, because in the "pecking order" of laws, the statutory always prevails
over the jurisprudential. However, each of the combatants has what it may view
as the ultimate weapon-the last word. The legislature can "trump" the court by
passing a statute in response to a rule of law fashioned by the court However,
the court, in turn, also has the last word because it ultimately interprets all
legislation, even the "trumping" legislation. Thus, both the legislature and the
court have the last word, meaning that there is really no last word at all, but
rather an endless dialogue (or duel) between the lawgivers. The problem is that
the attorney and his client must, in ordering their affairs, predict which branch
will be saying what and when. Understandably, those whose fortunes depend
upon the law may feel caught in the middle."
How did we come to such a state? Obviously, courts have always
interpreted legislation and some conflict is indigenous to our system of
government. But has the battle worsened? Is it out of control? If so, which
side should "back off'?
In the beginning, there was no real fight. The Louisiana Civil Code
originally contained only about 10 articles governing all of tort law. Those
articles were general pronouncements of legislative or social policy-empty
vessels into which the court could pour whatever it pleased. The most important
of these articles were Article 2315, providing generally that anyone who causes
damage by his "fault" must make amends therefor, and Article 2316, providing
more specifically for liability for some types of negligence.' The court has
referred to Articles 2315 and 2316 as the "fountainheads" of tort liability in
Louisiana. However, they are fountainheads out of which the court decides
what water pours. In the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the
Louisiana Supreme Court exercised its power to decide what constituted fault
3. Of course, the legislature cannot "trump" the court if the court decides that a statute the
legislature has passed is unconstitutional. However, the legislature can either enact a new statute on
the same subject which passes constitutional muster or turn directly to the people by proposing a
constitutional amendment which overrules the court's earlier decision.
4. The lawyer or judge may at least take some solace here that we have switched metaphors and
that he or she is not being crushed between rocks.
5. One might reasonably conclude that Article 2315 itself is sufficient to encompass negligence.
6. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971). There, Justice Barham wrote that
the Civil Code articles governing tort liability give the courts:
(A] broad, general principle of legislative will under which we are required to determine
when the interest of society is best served by allowing the act of man which causes harm
to be accepted as a proper standard of conduct or when society is best served by requiring
one who harms another to respond in damages for the injury caused.
Id. at 137.
7. Although the Civil Code provides a definition of three levels of "fault," those definitions are
rarely cited and never meaningfully relied upon in modem tort law. See La. Civ. Code art. 3506(13).
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somewhat sparingly, generally following the American common law approach to
tort liability. Interestingly, the court on occasion followed the common law
although doing so required it to ignore express codal language which strongly
suggested a different result. For example, Article 2320 provides that a master's
liability for the torts of its servant only attaches "when the masters ... might
have prevented the act which caused the damage."' Read literally, that language
requires some actual, personal fault on the master's part, i.e., the failure to
prevent the damage. However, the court ignored the quoted language,9 instead
adopting the common law's doctrine of respondeat superior which imposes
liability upon the master if the employee commits a tort in the course and scope
of his employment."0 Another notable example was the court's adoption of the
common law rule that the plaintiff's contributory negligence barred recovery in
a negligence action," even though the language of former Article 2323
suggested, if not compelled, that comparative fault should apply. 2 Those early
judicial interpretations of the Civil Code which deviated from the precise
language of the Civil Code produced little furor. The decisions, while arguably
inconsistent with the letter of the Civil Code, nevertheless were consistent with
the mainstream of American jurisprudence. Then, as now, it was important that
Louisiana law be consistent with that of its sibling states.
Then, about a quarter of a century ago, the climate changed. To some, the
court began an unreasonable expansion of the scope of tort liability, and that
expansion brought criticism. Undoubtedly, the court expanded tqrt liability, but
one can argue persuasively that the court was merely doing what it had done all
along-interpret Louisiana tort legislation in the light of the common law. As
the Louisiana Supreme Court was expanding tort liability, American tort law in
general was undergoing a veritable liability explosion.' 3 In fact, in some areas
the court did not keep pace with the common law's expansion. One example
was the Louisiana Supreme Court's initial tentative adoption of strict product
liability in tort.' 4 However, in some areas the court went further than the
common law. The most notable example was when the court, following the
French interpretations of the analogous articles in the Civil Code, applied the
8. La. Civ. Code art. 2320.
9. Weaver v. W.L. Goulden Logging Co., 116 La. 468, 40 So. 2d 798 (1906).
10. The Codal language is not "course and scope of employment," but rather the "exercise of the
functions in which they are employed." La. Civ. Code art. 2320.
11. Fleytas v. Pontchartrain R.R., 18 La. 339 (1841).
12. See, e.g., Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985). See also Wex S. Malone,
Comparative Negligence-Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 La. L. Rev. 125 (1945).
13. See generally George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. Legal Stud. 461 (1985); Gary T. Schwartz,
The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601
(1992).
14. See, e.g., Weber v. Fidelity & Casulaty Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754 (La. 1971); Landry v. Bill
Garrett Chevrolet, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1051, 1057-59 (La. App. 4th Cit. 1983).
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doctrine of strict liability to owners and guardians of buildings and things.
This expansion was accomplished by applying the common law's notions of
enterprise liability, risk spreading, and unreasonably dangerous products to our
unique Civil Code articles.
As liability expanded, those who lost tort battles in the courts remembered
the "pecking order" of laws and turned to the legislature. Within a short time,
legislation governing tort liability swelled. Several Civil Code articles were
added, 7 and several others were amended, 8 but by far the greatest effect of
tort reform was felt in the Civil Code "ancillaries" and elsewhere. That portion
of Title 9 of the Revised Statutes dealing with tort law now fills the better part
of a volume, and medical malpractice legislation occupies a substantial portion
of another volume.' 9 This legislative proliferation of tort regulation, however,
did not "daunt" the court. It continued to interpret the relevant statutes in ways
which produced, in the court's view, the proper balance of societal policies and
just results. In turn, the legislature sometimes reacted by amending the relevant
statute in an attempt to reverse the court's interpretation. 0 In one noteworthy
incident, the legislature was in session when the court interpreted a statute in a
manner with which the legislature apparently did not agree. The legislature
responded by passing another statute which overruled the court's result and took
effect even before the court's decision which prompted it became final.2'
Despite some popular misconceptions, it is not always the defendant who
loses in the courts and turns to the legislature. For example, the Louisiana
Supreme Court has refused to follow its sibling courts and allow general
recovery for negligent or intentional interference with contract. A more recent
15. See, e.g., Boyer v. Seal, 553 So. 2d 827 (La. 1989) (holding that La. Civ. Code art. 2321
imposes strict liability upon owners of domestic animals); Olsen v. Shell Oil Co., 365 So. 2d 1285
(La. 1978) (holding that La. Civ. Code art. 2322 imposes strict liability upon owners of buildings);
Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975) (holding that La. Civ. Code art. 2317 imposes strict
liability upon custodians of things).
16. See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Weber v.
Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754 (La. 1971).
17. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315.1, 2315.2, 2315.3, 2315.4, 2315.5, 2315.6, 2315.7, 2322.1, 2324.1
and 2324.2.
18. La. Civ. Code arts. 2315, 2323 and 2324.
19. See, e.g., La. R.S.-9:2794 (1991); La. R.S. 9:5628 (1991); La. R.S. 40:1299-1300.16 (1992).
20. See, e.g., Bunge Corp. v. GATX Corp., 557 So. 2d 1376 (La. 1990). InBunge Corp., the Court
held that La. R.S. 9:2772 (1990), the ten year peremptive period applicable to actions against building
professionals, did not apply to the particular failure to warn/duty to disclose claim before the court
because the failure to warn fell within the "fraud" exception to the statute. The legislature acted quickly
to overrule Bunge Corp. by amending La. R.S. 9:2772 (1991) to provide that "fraud," as the term was
used in that statute, has the same meaning as in La. Civ. Code art. 1953. 1990 La. Acts No. 712, § 1.
21. See, e.g., DeBattista v. Argonaut-Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26 (La. 1981) (providing a
strict product liability action against a health care provider who provided infected blood to a patient);
1981 La. Acts No. 611, § 1 (codified at La. Civ. Code art. 2322.1); 1981 La. Acts No. 331, § 1
(codified at La. R.S. 9:2797 (1991)). Now, both the Civil Code article and the statute not only
proscribe strict liability actions against the applicable provider of blood, organs or tissue, but
apparently also proscribe a claim in redhibition.
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example is the court's interpretation of a legislative act governing forfeiture of
workers' compensation benefits for false statements made for the purpose of
obtaining such benefits.' The court concluded that the better societal policy
was to require forfeiture even though the worker was not put on notice of the
consequences of making the false statement and the employer was not prejudiced
by the false statement.
As the battle between the court and the legislature has intensified and the
strategies have been refined, the legislature's most apparent strategy, consciously
adopted or not, has been to "micromanage" tort law. The legislature has passed
a score of statutes dealing with the liability of particular classes of people for
particular types of misconduct. Nowhere is this trend clearer than in the spate
of "limited immunity" statutes adopted in recent years. For instance, if a parade
attendee is hit by an object thrown from a float (like a coconut or a head of
cabbage, depending on the time of year and the type of parade), the parade
organizer probably is immune from tort liability. A similar statute provides
immunity, except for "a deliberate and wanton act or gross negligence," to
organizations sponsoring Mardi Gras parades or other parades "connected with
pre-Lenten festivities or the Holiday in Dixie Parade."2" Another statute
immunizes the organizers of St. Patrick's Day and other ethnic parades.2
Additionally, a director of a non-profit organization may be covered by at least
three separate immunity statutes for the same act or conduct." The owner of
non-profit recreational land opened to the public, but not necessarily to all of the
public, is covered by two immunity statutes which limit liability for acts less
blameworthy than willful or malicious misconduct.2 6 Owners of recreational
lands in Louisiana will be pleased to learn that they are immunized if they open
their land up for snow mobiling or snow skiing. The last legislative session
may have produced the ultimate in micromanagement. If you are assisting the
council on aging, you are personally immune unless your conduct is intentional
or willful, but your auto liability insurer is liable, for your negligence or strict
liability.2" Also, if you are providing health care at a designated Lafayette
Parish health clinic, but not any other, you enjoy a special immunity.29
22. Resweber v. Haroil Constr. Co., 660 So. 2d 7 (La. 1995).
23. La. R.S. 9:2796 (1991).
24. La. R.S. 9:2796.1 (Supp. 1995). See also Trondsen v. Irish-Italian Parade Comm., 656 So. 2d
694 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995). One may sense the irony in that participants in a parade honoring the
discoverer of America must claim it is an "ethnic" parade to enjoy immunity, while participants in a
parade honoring the man who drove the snakes out of Ireland are expressly provided with immunity.
25. La. R.S. 9:2792 (1991); La. R.S. 9:2792.1 (1991); La. R.S. 9:2792.3 (1991).
26. La. R.S. 9:2791 (1991); La. R.S. 9:2795 (1991).
27. La. R.S. 9:2795A(3) (1991). Actually, the happenstance of snow in parts of Louisiana may
lead to serious injury. In one well publicized case, a snow sledder on the Louisiana Tech campus
suffered serious injuries in a sledding accident. Pitre v. Louisiana Tech Univ., 655 So. 2d 659 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1995), writs granted, 616 So. 2d 454 (1995).
28. 1995 La. Acts. No. 1288, § 1 (to be codified at La. R.S. 9:2792.9).
29. 1995 La. Acts No. 1230, § 2 (to be codified at La. R.S. 9:2799.5).
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Several years ago, the legislature created what might be called an
"anticipatory" immunity. The legislature immunized certified poison control
centers from tort liability absent gross negligence, bad faith, or other willful or
wanton misconduct. 0 However, as the legislature expressly recognized in the
statute," there was at the time no certified poison control center 2 in
Louisiana.33 The immunity was created because insurance was unavailable for
such an operation, and it was hoped that a particularized, context-specific statute
dealing with tort liability would induce someone to open a poison control center.
Thus, in a way the immunity statute was enacted not in response to a decision by
the court, but in anticipation of one. In battle parlance, the statute was a preemptive
strike. In another notable example, after the court provided a detailed answer to a
certified question on Louisiana product liability law, the legislature responded by
codifying the law but specifically overruling the crux of the court's decision.'
The turf war has become so intense that both combatants have sought alliances
with the only other important player in the mix-the people. The supreme court
has found constitutional roots in some of the tort liability it has established33 and
in some of its interpretations of tort legislation.36 This means, of course, that
because the court's decision has a constitutional base, the legislature cannot simply
"trump" the court by passing a statute, but must obtain passage of a constitutional
amendment." But two can play that game. After the Louisiana Supreme Court
invalidated legislation limiting general damages available from the state 38 and
limiting the amount of prejudgment interest recoverable from the state39 as
impermissible resurrections of sovereign immunity,' the legislature turned to the
people to reestablish sovereign immunity through a Constitutional amendment.4'
The amendment passed, but now the court gets to interpret it.
The battling between the court and legislature can get inane at times, as
demonstrated by a 1995 act. The legislature long ago chose to immunize the
30. La. R.S. 9:2797.1 (1991).
31. La. R.S. 9:2797.1A (1991).
32. La. R.S. 9:2797.1 (1991).
33. See 1989 La. Acts No. 528, § I (codified at La. R.S. 9:2797.1 (1991)).
34. One of the major purposes and effects of the Louisiana Products Liability Act, La. R.S.
9:2800.51-2800.59 (1991), was to abolish the "unreasonably dangerous per se" liability created by
Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986). See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan,
Jr., The Louisiana Product Liability Law: Making Sense of It All, 49 La. L. Rev. 629, 630-38 (1989).
35. Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1387-90 nn.2, 4 & 7 (La. 1979).
36. See Hondroulis v. Schumacher. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
37. Alternatively, of course, and depending upon the court's holding, the legislature may pass
another constitutional statute. See, e.g., Hondroulis, 553 So. 2dat 398; La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1992).
38. La. K.S. 13:5106(B)(1) (1991) was held unconstitutional in Chamberlain v. State, 624 So. 2d
874 (La. 1993).
39. La. R.S. 13:5112(C) (1991) was held unconstitutional in Rick v. State, 630 So. 2d 1271 (La.
1994).
40. La. Const. art. XII, § 10 abolishes sovereign immunity in tort and contract cases.
41. See 1995 La. Acts No. 828; 1995 La. Acts No. 1328.
[Vol. 56
1995] LOUISIANA TORTLAW
employer from the employee's work-related tort claim 2 unless the employer's
injuring conduct is intentional.43 The battles over what is and what is not an
intentional tort for the purposes of employer immunity are so numerous' and
sometimes so conflicting that further comment here would not be productive.4
However, a recent "employer immunity" battle indicates the Legislature's apparent
frustration with the court's "interpretations" of legislation. In the celebrated case
of Billiot v. B. P. Oil Co.,' the Louisiana Supreme Court further eroded the
employer's immunity by holding that it did not apply to punitive damage claims
arising out of willful and wanton handling of toxic materials. 47 The legislature
quickly responded to overrule the holding of Billiot, but it also attempted to send
a message to the court. Hence the language of Act 432 of 1995: the employer's
immunity is "exclusive of all other rights ... including.., punitive or exemplary
damages, unless such rights.., are created by a statute, whether now existing or
created in the future, expressly establishing same as available.' '41 What if the
42. 1914 La. Acts No. 20.
43. 1976 La. Acts No. 147, § 1. See generally Shannan C. Sweeney, The Intentional Act
Exception to the Exclusivity of Workers' Compensation, 44 La. L. Rev. 1507 (1984).
44. Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987); Dycus v. Martin Marietta Corp., 568 So. 2d 592
(La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 571 So. 2d 649 (1990).
45. One should note that sometimes the court has interpreted a statute so as to "rescue" the
legislative will from inartful statutory drafting. For example, when the legislature amended the
workers' compensation statutes in 1976 to provide executive officers with immunity, it created the
intentional misconduct exclusion. 1976 La. Acts No. 147, § 1. However, rather than using the words
"intentional tort," which had a commonly accepted meaning in the legal community, the legislature
provided that the workers' compensation immunity did not extend to an "intentional act." See La.
R.S. 23:1032A (1989). The problem is that many "acts" are intended, but the consequences are not.
Intent, in the tort arena, refers to the consequences of the act, i.e., harmful and offensive contact for
a battery, placing one in apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact for an assault, etc. A
resourceful plaintiff's lawyer seized upon the "intentional act" language and argued that it meant
"voluntary act." If the court had accepted that reading of the key language, it would have exposed
employers to potential tort liability for negligence in many cases because negligence often arises out
of a voluntary act. Wisely, the court, in an opinion by Justice Dennis, refused to so read the critical
language, noting that one of the purposes of the 1975 legislation was to broaden the immunity and
that reading intentional act to mean voluntary act would in effect vastly expand the employer's tort
liability and narrow his immunity. Bazely v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
46. 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994).
47. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3 provides for the recovery of exemplary damages, in addition to
general and special damages, where the defendant has wantonly and recklessly disregarded the public
safety in the handling, storage or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances.
48. 1995 La. Acts No. 432 (amending La. R.S. 23:1032 (1989)). Because of its choice of
language, the legislature was not crystal clear in its attempt to overrule Billiot. This is because the
amended statute preserves "now existing" punitive damages claims "expressly" provided for by
statute. No existing statute expressly grants an employee the right to recover punitive damages from
his employer, unless one considers the penalty provisions of the compensation statute as doing so.
However, the compensation statute already excludes any penalty from its exclusivity provision. La.
R.S. 23:1032(A)(1)(a) (Supp. 1995). If the "now existing" language refers to the penalty provisions
of the compensation statute itself, it is mere surplusage. Thus, it arguably refers to something else,
but the only other statute which had been interpreted to provide an employee with a right to recover
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1997 legislature establishes another "right" to recover punitive damages and does
not expressly provide whether that right is within the employer's immunity?
Reading Act 432, one would conclude that the 1995 legislature intended that the
employer's immunity extend to such a newly created right. However, it would be
the intent of the 1997 legislature, and not that of the 1995 legislature, that would
control. And who will decide what the 1997 legislature intended?49
Another major skirmish in this torts "turf" battle is occurring in the "solidarity
zone."50 The general question is age-old and perplexing: as between the tort victim
and the tortfeasor, who should bear the risk that a third person whose conduct
contributed to the harm is immune, insolvent, or unknown? A little history helps
understand where Louisiana is today and how it got there.
The first "joint" tortfeasors were intentional tortfeasors, usually acting in
concert to cause the victim's harm.5 If one of the intentional tortfeasors was
insolvent, the other tortfeasor was liable for all of the damages. Usually the harm
was indivisible, such as a broken leg, but even if it was divisible, the actors'
conduct was so egregious that it seemed imminently fair to make each "tortfeasor"
liable, i.e., the plaintiff could make either or any of them pay all of the plaintiffs
damages. It was the plaintiff s ability to make any of the tortfeasors pay for the
damages that led the civil law to say the tortfeasors were solidarily liable.52 The
common law reached the same result with a different legal label: the tortfeasors
were jointly and severally liable.53
Then along came negligence and a more challenging scenario: two negligent
actors whose conduct coalesced to cause indivisible harm. Here the law took a
strange turn. If the negligence of the two actors impacted upon the body of the
punitive damages from the employer was La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3. However, that article does not
expressly provide the right. Consequently, something in the critical language of Act 432 is
meaningless. Either the "now existing" language means nothing and Billiot is overruled, the probable
result, or the "expressly" provided language means nothing and Billiot is not overruled. In any event,
Act 432 applies prospectively only. Thus, Billiot claims arising before the passage of the act should
continue on their course through the litigation process.
49. Interestingly, the recent history of employer/employee tort relations can be viewed through
the lens of the turf battle between the legislature and the court. After the legislature, arguably in
response to a series of court opinions, extensively amended the workers' compensation statutes in
1989 to make compensation more difficult to recover, see 1989 La. Acts No. 454, the court has
responded by permitting employees to recover in tort for their employer's negligence. See, e.g., Cox
v. Glazer Steel Corp., 606 So. 2d 518 (La. 1992); Weber v. State, 635 So. 2d 188 (La. 1994); Stelly
v. Overhead Door Co., 646 So. 2d 905 (La. 1994). See also Hunt v. Milton J. Womack, Inc., 616
So. 2d 759 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
50. The reader should not confuse the "solidarity zone" with the famous "Twilight Zone" of both
television and maritime fame. The reader who lived through the Vietnam war may confuse the
"solidarity zone" with the "demilitarized zone"-both have proved far from peaceful.
51. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 46 (5th ed. 1984).
52. See, e.g., Narcise v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 427 So. 2d 1192 (La. 1983); Rumpf v. Callo,
132 So. 763 (La. App. Orl. 1931).




victim at different times, such as automobile accidents months apart, the courts
"divided" the indivisible, thus making each of these "successive" tortfeasors pay
only a part of the damages.54 The jurisprudence accomplished this by saying
that the damages were, in fact, divisible, even though that result defied medical
science. Thus, the risk that the other tortfeasor was insolvent or otherwise
unable to respond in judgment was borne by the victim.5 However, there was
one major "exception": if the second tortfeasor's wrong was within the scope
of the risks of the first tortfeasor's duty, the first tortfeasor owed all of the
damages. For instance, if Planiol negligently injured Livingston's back and then
Dr. Tullier committed malpractice upon Livingston during his treatment of the
injured back, Planiol was liable for all of Livingston's injuries, including those
caused by Tullier's malpractice. Planiol was liable for all the damages, even
where they were otherwise divisible. This exception was merely a
straightforward application of general tort principles regarding duty and legal
cause, or in Louisiana, duty/risk.
56
Finally, there is the scenario in which the two negligent acts impact upon the
body of the victim at the same time, or at almost the same time, and produce an
indivisible injury, which is almost always the case." The courts, following the
intentional tortfeasor jurisprudence, ruled that those negligent parties, concurrent
tortfeasors, were liable for the full amount, i.e., they were solidarily (jointly and
severally) liable. This arguably was a fair result. One could not divide the
damages and before comparative negligence, one could not divide, or "quantify,"
the fault of the tortfeasors to permit each to pay only the damages attributable
to his percentage of fault. Thus, under the then-existing state of the law, the risk
of the insolvent, immune, or unknown tortfeasor had to be borne by either the
victim or the solvent tortfeasor, and the choice of the latter was consistent with
many of the objectives of tort law.
But then came comparative negligence and with it the concept that fault
could be quantified. This development, coupled with the phenomena of tort
54. See, e.g., Jarreau v. Hirschey, 650 So. 2d 1189 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994). See also Radbum
v. Fir Tree Lumber Co., 145 P. 632 (Wash. 1915).
55. In some cases in which the plaintiff could not prove who caused what damage, the plaintiff
took nothing. See Deutsch v. Connecticut Co., 119 A. 891 (Conn. 1923); Maas v. Perkins, 253 P.2d
427 (Wash. 1953). However, the clear trend in Louisiana in such cases is to divide the indivisible
and allow the factfinder to make any arguably acceptable appropriation of damages between the two
accidents. For a recent example, see Buccola v. Marchese, 599 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992)
(damages from two accidents occurring several months apart and involving two separate drivers must
be apportioned, though the apportionment is somewhat arbitrary).
56. See generally Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Hill v. Lundin and Associates Revisited: Duty/Risked
to Death? (1993); Frank L. Maraist, I Louisiana Practice Series-Louisiana Tort Law: Cases and
Materials 75 (1995).
57. Here, for simplicity's sake, we assume that the duty of one tortfeasor does not include the risk
of the other tortfeasor's wrong. Where it does, a straightforward duty/risk application would make




reform and its liability limiting rules, has caused most jurisdictions to re-evaluate
solidary (joint and several) liability between negligent joint tortfeasors. Some
jurisdictions have repudiated solidarity,s some have maintained it, and others
have modified it.9 The Louisiana Legislature chose the third approach in 1987
when it amended Article 2324 to provide, in relevant part, that:
B. If liability is not solidary pursuant to Paragraph A, or as
otherwise provided by law, then liability for damages caused by two or
more persons shall be solidary only to the extent necessary for the
person suffering injury, death, or loss to recover fifty percent of his
recoverable damages; however, when the amount of recovery has been
reduced in accordance with the preceding Article, a judgment debtor
shall not be liable for more than the degree of his fault to a judgment
creditor to whom a greater degree of fault has been attributed. Under
the provisions of this Article, all parties shall enjoy their respective
rights of indemnity and contribution. Except as described in Paragraph
A of this Article, or as otherwise provided by law, and hereinabove, the
liability for damages caused by two or more persons shall be a joint,
divisible obligation, and a joint tortfeasor shall not be solidarily liable
with any other person for damages attributable to the fault of such other
person, including the person suffering injury, death, or loss, regardless
of such other person's insolvency, ability to pay, degree of fault, or
immunity by statute or otherwise.60
While the amendment is by no means a model of clarity, one thing is
obvious: the legislature did not intend that a person whose negligence coalesced
with that of an immune, insolvent, or unknown person to cause indivisible
damage would be liable for all of those damages. Obviously, one might conclude
that it is unfair to impose upon the victim, particularly the innocent, i.e., non-
negligent one, some or all of the risk of the immune, insolvent, or unknown joint
tortfeasor. Indeed, some jurisdictions which have adopted comparative fault still
impose all of that risk upon the solvent tortfeasor.6 However, that arguably
was not what the Louisiana Legislature chose. It amended Article 2324 to
provide for a modified or truncated form of solidarity. But until the court spoke,
58. For an exhaustive review of the differing approaches to allocation of the insolvent tortfeasor's
share after the advent of comparative negligence, see Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113
(5th Cir. 1995). See also 2 Comparative Negligence § 13.30 (1988).
59. Id.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 2324(B). La. Civ. Code art. 2324(A) deals with the solidary liability of
intentional or willful tortfeasors; although it raises some interesting interpretive issues, it probably
does not significantly change the law. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Article 2324: The
Discombobulating State of Solidarity in Post Tort Reform Louisiana, 54 La. L. Rev. 551, 557-62
(1994). La. Civ. Code art. 2324(C) deals with the interruption of prescription.
61. 2 Comparative Negligence § 13.20 (1988).
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one would not know precisely what the legislature created. And speak the court
has, much to the chagrin of joint tortfeasors.
First, in the celebrated case of Touchard v. Williams,62 the Court ruled that
2324(B) did not limit solidarity to the plaintiff's recovery of 50% of his
damages. Relying upon the phrase "to the extent necessary," the defendants
argued that after the plaintiff recovered 50% of her total damages, no one is
solidarily liable for the remainder because solidarity is not necessary for the
plaintiff to recover 50%. The court rejected this reading, concluding instead that
the article merely imposed a 50% "cap" on the solidarity of a negligent
defendant whose percentage of the fault was less than 50%.63 Thus, although
the article did not apply to a tortfeasor whose fault was greater than 50%, a
tortfeasor whose fault was less than 50% was potentially liable for up to 50% of
the damages. But did this 50% "cap" apply to each defendant, or was it a per
case, or per obligation, "cap"? A footnote in Touchard indicated that only one
of the tortfeasors whose fault was less than 50% could be "bumped up" to
50%.64
What about the immune tortfeasor? He could not be cast in judgment, but
who would absorb the economic cost of his contribution to the accident?
Plaintiff? The solvent, non-immune defendant? Both? Or whomever the
factfinder chose? In Gauthier v. O'Brien,65 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the immune employer's fault should be quantified but then should be
reallocated to the other at-fault parties, including plaintiff, in proportion to their
allocated portions of fault." Under that reallocation "formula," the victim/
employee and the non-immune tortfeasor(s) would bear the "fault" of the
immune employer in relation to their relative percentages of fault. But did the
Touchard 50% "cap" apply in an employer fault case? The court indicated in
a footnote in Gauthier that it did not.67
Before returning to the Gauthier issues, the court providedsome interesting
harbingers that the 50% limit on a joint tortfeasor's liability provided in Article
2324(B) could be avoided by application of the scope of the risk analysis. In
62. 617 So. 2d 885 (La. 1993).
63. See Galligan, supra note 60, at 562-67.
64. Touchard, 617 So. 2d at 887 n.3. See generally Galligan, supra note 60, at 567-71.
65. 618 So. 2d 825 (La. 1993). Prior to Gauthier, the court had held that under the original
version of La. Civ. Code art. 2324, an employer's fault should not be quantified by the factfinder.
See, e.g., Guidry v. Frank Guidry Oil Co., 579 So. 2d 947 (La. 1991); Melton v. General Elec. Co.,
579 So. 2d 448 (La. 1991).
66. Somewhat illogically, but consistently with prior jurisprudence, the employer would be
entitled to recover through subrogation any compensation payments he had made to the employee,
reduced by the employee's fault. See supra note 65; La. Civ. Code art. 2323. Thus, the employer's
fault does not directly affect its compensation payments, but would only directly affect its
recoupment; if some of the employer's fault was reallocated to the plaintiff/employee, the employer's
recovery would be reduced by that reallocated portion.
67. Gauthier, 618 So. 2d at 830 n.l1; see also Galligan, supra note 60, at 578-84.
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Lambert v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,8 the plaintiff sued the
defendant seeking damages for an injury caused by the defendant and aggravated
by post-trauma medical treatment of those injuries. Defendant then attempted to
allege and prove the fault of the allegedly negligent doctor who provided the
post-trauma treatment. In a per curiam opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court
held that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow the defendant to amend
his answer to allege the fault of the doctor. The court pointed out that if the
defendant was at fault he would be liable for all of the plaintiff's damages,
including those caused by the health care provider, because the defendant would
be the "legal cause" of all the damages. Put differently, in duty/risk rubric, the
defendant's duty included the risk of the subsequent medical injury, even if
caused by a negligent physician."
Then, in Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd.," the court was
presented with a case in which the fault of an unknown intentional tortfeasor (an
unidentified rapist) and a negligent tortfeasor (plaintiff-victim's lessor, an
apartment complex operator) coalesced to cause indivisible harm: the rape of the
tenant. If Article 2324 applied literally in this situation, the fault of the
concurrent tortfeasors, the rapist and the apartment complex operator, would be
compared and the operator would be cast for his percentage of fault or 50%,
whichever was greater. However, using a scope of the risk analysis, the court
reached a different conclusion. A divided court held that because the "specific"
risk which made the complex operator's conduct negligent was the criminal
attack by the rapist, the complex operator was liable for the full amount. Thus,
the trial court had not erred in refusing to ask the jury, which had decided the
case, to allocate fault to the phantom rapist. The decision meant that functionally
the apartment complex operator was in the same position as the negligent auto
driver whose accident victim is thereafter subjected to malpractice by the treating
physician. The apartment complex operator in Veazey occupied the same legal
position as the initial tortfeasor in Lambert.
Identifying the "specific" risk within the defendant's duty may be a rather
nebulous quest without a clear answer. As both Lambert and Veazey illustrate,
"scope of the risk" can be a "slippery slope" to responsibility, i.e., liability, for
the unforeseeable and to what some might deem the unreasonable. However,
Lambert relied upon commonly accepted duty/risk principles applied in
successive tortfeasor cases. Most jurisdictions hold subsequent malpractice is,
as a rule, deemed "foreseeable" to the initial tortfeasor. While Veazey is not
such a case, it is unusual in that the risk that occurred was the exact risk that
made the negligent tortfeasor negligent. If one asks the question "is it
unreasonably risky to fail to provide adequate security at an apartment complex
68. 629 So. 2d 328 (La. 1993).
69. The court cited Weber v. Charity Hosp., 475 So. 2d 1047 (La. 1985), for this proposition.
While Weber does stand for the rule of law relied upon by the Court, Weber was decided under the
old version of Article 2324.
70. 650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994).
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which houses women," one of the first thoughts that comes to mind is "yes,
because one of the tenants may be subjected to rape by an intruder."
But, what if you apply the Veazey/Lambert approach to two negligent
tortfeasors whose conduct impacts upon the victim at the same time, and the risk
that occurs is not that exact? That situation was not long in presenting itself to
the court. In Turner v. Massiah,71 two doctors, acting independently, malprac-
ticed upon a victim, causing loss of a chance of survival. What result?
Comparative fault with 50% solidarity? Not so, said the supreme court. Because
the negligence of each was within the scope of the risks of the other, each was
liable for the full amount. Thus, the court made a potential "end run" around the
50% cap of Article 2324(B), using "scope of the risks" as its blocker. But,
unlike the traditional end run, which is contained by the football field's sidelines,
this end run can be extended as far as a court will allow "proximate cause,"
"legal cause," or "duty/risk" to stretch. One can logically extend Turner to hold
that the duty of a driver to his passenger includes the risk of collision with
another faulty driver, thereby exposing driver one, and maybe driver two, to
100% liability to driver one's passenger.
More recently, the court has revisited the Gauthier employer fault issue and
its reasoning has ramifications as far-reaching as any of its prior decisions on
solidary liability. In Cavalier v. Cain's Hydrostatic Testing, Inc.,72 the court
unanimously concluded that its Gauthier decision on allocation of employer fault
was wrong. The new rule: where there is a workplace victim, a single tortfeasor
and the victim's immune employer, the employer's "fault" should not be
quantified. Thus, if the victim is not contributorily negligent, the third party
tortfeasor will owe 100% of the damages. However, Cavalier went even further.
The court opined that under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1812(C),
non-party fault should not generally be quantified "unless there is a compelling
reason, such as in the case of a settling tortfeasor."' "7 Thus, the defendant
cannot point to the empty chair and place a portion of the blame on someone not
before the court other than one who has settled with the plaintiff. The decision
in Cavalier may force defendants to name as third-party defendants all possible
tortfeasors as parties. But is there a way to make a "phantom" a party to a
lawsuit? If not, then after Cavalier a negligent tortfeasor is liable for the full
amount of the damages, if his "joint tortfeasor" is immune or unknown, and the
plaintiff is blameless. Of course, if the defendant brings in a third-party
defendant and proves that party's fault, the 50% limit of Article 2324(B) should
apply. Obviously, after the defendant names a third-party defendant, the plaintiff
has an incentive to amend his petition to state a claim directly against the third-
party defendant. Thus, Cavalier will lead to litigation among actual, involved
71. 656 So. 2d 636 (La. 1995).
72. 657 So. 2d 975 (La. 1995).
73. Id. at 982. After Cavalier a defendant can argue that it should be exonerated because a non-
party was a superseding cause or a "sole proximate" cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Cavalier does
not discuss this possibility.
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parties and will frustrate efforts to blame those not present. Of course, where a
non-party really is unknown, unavailable, or immune, the defendant cannot make
him a party and the jury cannot be told to quantify his fault. However, evidence
about the "absent" actor's conduct ordinarily will be relevant to the fault of the
plaintiff and the defendant(s). The jury that hears that evidence may be inclined
to attribute more or less fault to the present defendant or to the plaintiff or may
"prorate" between the plaintiff and defendant its perception of the absentee's
contribution to the event in suit. One can argue that the problem is best resolved
in the give and take of the jury room rather than by legislative fiat or judicial
rule cast in stone. Cavalier achieves that result.
After Cavalier, what if there are two or more solvent defendants who are
named parties? Put another way, what effect, if any, does Cavalier have on the
Touchard footnote which indicated the 50% "cap" was a "per case cap?" In a
footnote in Cavalier,4 the court indicated that "each" solvent available
defendant whose fault was less than 50% could be made to pay 50% of the total
damages. This later footnote arguably repudiates the earlier Touchard footnote.
Thus one can argue, after Cavalier, that a blameless victim who is injured by a
solvent tortfeasor and an immune or unknown tortfeasor, or a blameless victim
who is injured by two or more solvent tortfeasors, can collect 100% of his
damages. In essence, the blameless plaintiff bears none of the risks of the
immune, insolvent, or unknown tortfeasor. Arguably, after Cavalier, Article
2324(B) has lessened practical significance, and things should stay that way for
a while. Clearly a court which kept Cavalier under advisement for six months,
was then unanimous in its decision, and which carefully explained its rationale
and the implications of that rationale for other cases, must have intended its
decision to be the last word. And probably it will be, until 1997."5 But one can
anticipate that the business interests in the legislature will be seeking a revision
of Article 2324 in 1997, a revision that would affect Cavalier.
Stepping back, is there a "villain" in this "turf war"? Not in the traditional
sense. Many legislators no doubt believe in good faith that the court has
expanded liability too far. And the court no doubt is concerned that broad
principle, rather than detailed, specific rules tailored to protect specific interest
groups, should guide tort law.76 When either body believes that the other has
gone too far, it can use its power to move the pendulum back to what it
perceives to be the "center." One also must remember that each of the
combatants may honestly believe that the other is invading its "turf." Tradition-
ally, the legislature made broad pronouncements of how people generally should
act. But it is the court system, supervised by the supreme court, which must see
that justice is achieved in a particular case in which the actors' fortunes are at
74. Id. at 982 n.6.
75. The 1996 legislature is limited to fiscal matters.
76. Even Article 2324(B), which applies in all nonintentional tort cases, does not apply in non-tort
cases. Thus, the truncated solidarity it creates is limited to tort cases.
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stake. The line between the two--broad rules and specific justice-is not always
clear, and a participant in this "turf war" may unwittingly usurp the other's
function while trying to perform its own.
A traditional argument is that courts are inferior lawgivers because they are
limited generally to the facts and issues in the case before them, while the
legislature can gather data and formulate comprehensive rules to regulate a
particular area of human conduct. However, one must not overlook the fact that
legislation often is adopted in a somewhat frenzied and pressurized situation,
while the supreme court enjoys the luxury of providing its answer on its own
timetable. Sometimes the pressure and frenzy produce legislation which, at best,
borders upon the absurd. Consider Act 738 of 1995, providing that a retail dealer
of alcoholic beverages who substitutes one brand of beverage for a brand
specifically requested by the customer, without the customer's consent, is subject
to suit "for damages which result from the substitution" and attorney fees and
costs. It seems clear beyond peradventure that the judicial system should not be
burdened with a lawsuit by a bar patron irked because the bartender serves him
Rot Gut scotch instead of Johnny Walker. Yet unless the legislature repeals the
act, the court ultimately may be required to nullify in some fashion this "absolute
liability" for frivolous fault.
Some final points merit attention. Let us turn to what Justice Barham wrote
in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corporation:
Under [the tort articles of the Civil Code] the courts of this state have
been given a broad, general principle of legislative will under which we
are required to determine when the interest of society is best served by
allowing the act of man which causes harm to be accepted as a proper
standard of conduct or when society is best served by requiring one who
harms another to respond in damages for the injury caused. Our
common law neighbors are required, conversely, to begin with the
jurisprudence arising out of specific circumstances and to draw from
this jurisprudence a general principle to govern future determinations.
It has been said: "* * * The merit of the civilian general principle lies
in the fact that the principle is wider than the cases decided and that
hence it has within itself the potentiality of growth.""
Thus, under that interpretation of the civilian approach to torts, the courts
apply and give meaning to the broad principle provided by the Civil Code that
everyone should repair damages caused by his fault. That also is the approach
to torts adopted by the French courts and legislature. It is a sensible approach
if one considers that accidents are not planned.78 Because accidents occur in
unusual and sometimes bizarre manners, the best way to govern this area of the
77. 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (La. 1971) (citations omitted).




law is through a general standard which allows a society to defer decision on
responsibility for an injury until after the event has occurred.7 9 The common
law generally agrees with this approach.
However, one will note that many of the legal developments we have written
about involved detailed legislative efforts to dictate results in specific types of
cases. The immunity and solidarity legislation discussed above represent
legislative efforts to dictate the result in specific types of cases. In that regard,
these acts are inconsistent with what Justice Barham wrote in Langlois. For
instance, although Article 2324(B) arguably and literally applies in almost every
multi-tortfeasor, non-intentional tort case, the changes it makes in solidarity apply
only to tort cases. That is, the 50% cap on solidarity is tort specific; it does not
change the underlying principle of solidarity. It just truncates it in tort. The
immunity statutes are even more specific. They are special protection for special
groups. One searches for their principled base. Moreover, the immunity statutes
gnaw at and threaten the very fabric of the Civil Code's tort scheme.
What is the alternative to the turf war? One thought is to limit the effects of
the political process on the combatants. Witness the move to make judgeships
appointive and to limit the terms of legislators. At best, however, that will only
partially solve the problem because the problem is inherent in our form of
government. Someone must make the laws and someone must interpret and
apply them. It is the nature of a "checks and balances" governmental process
that the same body cannot enact and interpret. Given the different views
involved, the battle is inevitable. And whether the result achieved is good or bad
for society may depend upon "where one's ox is tied."
In closing, let's return to Jason and the Argonauts. The Argonauts found a
solution to the Symplegades-sending a dove flying ahead of the Argo. As the
dove flew between the rocks to the Bosporous, the Symplegades crashed
together, nipped the dove's tail feathers and then opened again, allowing the
Argonauts to quickly row through with minimal damage. Thereafter, the rocks
were stuck open forever.8' Thus, mythology offers at least the hope of a
solution if not concrete advice as to how to attain it. Modem day Louisiana tort
lawyers understandably hope for such a dove to lead them to the land beyond
colliding opposite forces.
79. As Justice Dennis wrote in Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983), a broad standard
allows the court, after the fact, to consider all the relevant moral, economic, and social factors
involved and then in the civilian tradition, decide the case as a legislator, looking at the same facts,
might decide. Id. at 1149.
80. Graves, supra note 1, at 200.
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